WEBVTT 00:00:01.920 --> 00:00:04.900 Eisenhardt's approach to multiple case studies 00:00:04.900 --> 00:00:07.930 has a very structured way of presenting evidence. 00:00:07.930 --> 00:00:08.850 Let's take a look at 00:00:08.850 --> 00:00:11.423 how Eisenhardt presents evidence in her research. 00:00:12.660 --> 00:00:14.640 We'll take a look at the other purposes 00:00:14.640 --> 00:00:15.790 in one of these paper, 00:00:15.790 --> 00:00:17.850 Eisenhardt and Burgeois, 1988. 00:00:17.850 --> 00:00:20.600 The proposition is that the greater decentralization 00:00:20.600 --> 00:00:23.640 of power to a chief executive, 00:00:23.640 --> 00:00:26.530 the greater use of politics within top management team. 00:00:26.530 --> 00:00:27.907 So this is just one proposition 00:00:27.907 --> 00:00:30.850 but is the most important proposition in the paper 00:00:30.850 --> 00:00:32.750 and the paper also contained 00:00:32.750 --> 00:00:36.500 many other propositions about how power 00:00:36.500 --> 00:00:39.690 and centralization of politics influence performance. 00:00:39.690 --> 00:00:41.160 But let's take a look at simply 00:00:41.160 --> 00:00:43.500 this power central assistant and politics. 00:00:43.500 --> 00:00:47.560 So our first, how do you present qualitative evidence? 00:00:47.560 --> 00:00:51.030 There is, there are basically are three different levels 00:00:51.030 --> 00:00:53.350 on which you can present evidence. 00:00:53.350 --> 00:00:57.450 When a beginner or qualitative researcher enters the field, 00:00:57.450 --> 00:01:00.350 we quite often see this kind of reporting. 00:01:00.350 --> 00:01:02.390 So interviews were done. 00:01:02.390 --> 00:01:04.790 I conclude that something happens 00:01:04.790 --> 00:01:06.730 and this kind of reporting 00:01:06.730 --> 00:01:11.730 basically relies on the competence of the researcher. 00:01:12.220 --> 00:01:15.800 So there is the claim is valid 00:01:15.800 --> 00:01:18.720 because you claim that you are a good research 00:01:18.720 --> 00:01:21.270 and that's not a very good way 00:01:21.270 --> 00:01:23.640 of presenting evidence or making claims. 00:01:23.640 --> 00:01:25.500 So just saying that you went to the company 00:01:25.500 --> 00:01:26.760 and you interviewed people, 00:01:26.760 --> 00:01:29.670 and then saying that based on those interviews, 00:01:29.670 --> 00:01:33.120 you came to the conclusion that power was centralized. 00:01:33.120 --> 00:01:36.110 How would we know that you made the right conclusion? 00:01:36.110 --> 00:01:38.440 So researchers opinion, 00:01:38.440 --> 00:01:40.830 even if it's based on analysis 00:01:40.830 --> 00:01:44.493 is not the ideal way of presenting evidence. 00:01:45.960 --> 00:01:48.920 So that's not really a good way. 00:01:48.920 --> 00:01:53.040 The second way is presenting the informants opinions 00:01:53.040 --> 00:01:56.960 or information months are reporting as results. 00:01:56.960 --> 00:01:59.980 So you might go to a company, interview the CEO 00:01:59.980 --> 00:02:01.930 and asked the CEO if power is centralized, 00:02:01.930 --> 00:02:03.060 the CEO says, yes. 00:02:03.060 --> 00:02:07.000 And then you report that there are the power is centralized 00:02:07.000 --> 00:02:08.640 because the CEO said so. 00:02:08.640 --> 00:02:12.370 And this is simply the same as the one before 00:02:12.370 --> 00:02:14.420 but instead of reporting your own opinion, 00:02:14.420 --> 00:02:16.490 you report somebody else's opinion. 00:02:16.490 --> 00:02:19.320 How do we know that the CEO is actually correct? 00:02:19.320 --> 00:02:21.240 We really don't. 00:02:21.240 --> 00:02:23.590 So that's not an ideal approach either. 00:02:23.590 --> 00:02:26.600 The better approach is to present evidence 00:02:26.600 --> 00:02:30.507 so what exactly did the interviewee say? 00:02:31.937 --> 00:02:35.690 And when were multiple interviews that describe things 00:02:35.690 --> 00:02:39.820 that are associated with power centralization 00:02:39.820 --> 00:02:40.950 then we can show that, 00:02:40.950 --> 00:02:44.660 okay, this is what the informants told us 00:02:44.660 --> 00:02:48.510 and that allowed us to come up with the conclusion 00:02:48.510 --> 00:02:50.920 that the power must be centralized. 00:02:50.920 --> 00:02:53.820 And this is the ideal approach for presenting evidence, 00:02:53.820 --> 00:02:55.620 because it allows your reader 00:02:55.620 --> 00:02:59.020 to also do the analysis themselves. 00:02:59.020 --> 00:03:03.160 So would the reader based on hearing what you heard 00:03:03.160 --> 00:03:04.580 make the same conclusion, 00:03:04.580 --> 00:03:07.150 and that gives the reader the chance 00:03:07.150 --> 00:03:08.390 to form their own opinion 00:03:08.390 --> 00:03:10.610 of whether you analyze the data correctly. 00:03:10.610 --> 00:03:13.270 This is called transparency of reporting, 00:03:13.270 --> 00:03:16.350 and it is very important in qualitative research 00:03:16.350 --> 00:03:18.550 because qualitative research is more subjective 00:03:18.550 --> 00:03:19.900 than quantitative research. 00:03:20.870 --> 00:03:21.930 Let's take a look at 00:03:21.930 --> 00:03:25.093 another important principle, triangulation. 00:03:25.950 --> 00:03:28.640 So quite often you'll see something like that. 00:03:28.640 --> 00:03:30.690 So one executive told us 00:03:30.690 --> 00:03:32.460 that Geoff runs the show. 00:03:32.460 --> 00:03:34.860 Geoff is like God and so on. 00:03:34.860 --> 00:03:36.770 And this is not a democracy. 00:03:36.770 --> 00:03:39.230 So this is what the informants told us, 00:03:39.230 --> 00:03:42.360 but simply what the informants told us 00:03:42.360 --> 00:03:43.890 is often not sufficient. 00:03:43.890 --> 00:03:46.170 So we want to all come up with 00:03:46.170 --> 00:03:48.240 other sources of evidence as well. 00:03:48.240 --> 00:03:51.780 So we might add some quantitative data. 00:03:51.780 --> 00:03:54.890 So for example, we have a survey, 00:03:54.890 --> 00:03:57.500 a form that the informants complete, 00:03:57.500 --> 00:04:00.080 that measures power centralization of some, 00:04:00.080 --> 00:04:01.610 with some kind of scale. 00:04:01.610 --> 00:04:05.090 And we have high scores for this organization. 00:04:05.090 --> 00:04:09.330 We might also have an objective fact, 00:04:09.330 --> 00:04:11.360 for example, meeting minutes 00:04:11.360 --> 00:04:13.770 that the CEO was the decision maker 00:04:13.770 --> 00:04:16.770 in multiple different functional areas. 00:04:16.770 --> 00:04:19.970 So based on these different sources of information, 00:04:19.970 --> 00:04:23.330 quantitative data, information from the minutes 00:04:23.330 --> 00:04:24.700 of who makes the decisions, 00:04:24.700 --> 00:04:26.440 and then how if there are people 00:04:26.440 --> 00:04:28.270 in the organization perceive things, 00:04:28.270 --> 00:04:31.260 we can conclude that power is centralized 00:04:31.260 --> 00:04:33.360 to the CEO, Geoff here. 00:04:33.360 --> 00:04:36.720 So multiple sources using different measures. 00:04:36.720 --> 00:04:39.420 And this is actually what the paper reports. 00:04:39.420 --> 00:04:41.780 So they report that anecdotes 00:04:41.780 --> 00:04:44.820 from interviews corroborated the quantitative data. 00:04:44.820 --> 00:04:48.270 Then, what you need to do is demonstrate association. 00:04:48.270 --> 00:04:51.590 Eisenhardt approach uses tables for this purpose. 00:04:51.590 --> 00:04:52.660 So what she does 00:04:52.660 --> 00:04:55.100 is that she tabulates different evidence 00:04:55.100 --> 00:04:56.690 of power centralization. 00:04:56.690 --> 00:04:58.945 So we have different aspects that, 00:04:58.945 --> 00:05:00.250 different things that we could observe 00:05:00.250 --> 00:05:01.720 if power is centralized, 00:05:01.720 --> 00:05:04.230 we have CEO description, CEO power score, 00:05:04.230 --> 00:05:07.100 CEO power distance, CEO dominated function, 00:05:07.100 --> 00:05:10.350 decision styles and then examples 00:05:10.350 --> 00:05:15.350 of how people explain the CEO's power or use of power. 00:05:15.600 --> 00:05:17.100 Then we infer that power 00:05:17.100 --> 00:05:20.070 is centralized in the first four cases 00:05:20.070 --> 00:05:22.100 and power is not centralized 00:05:22.100 --> 00:05:24.250 in the last four cases. 00:05:24.250 --> 00:05:28.300 So we quantify the qualitative evidence 00:05:28.300 --> 00:05:31.930 and we also combine it with some quantitative data. 00:05:31.930 --> 00:05:34.210 So these, forming these tables 00:05:34.210 --> 00:05:36.620 is one of the first steps 00:05:36.620 --> 00:05:39.290 when you start writing the results section, 00:05:39.290 --> 00:05:41.000 when you apply Eisenhardt approach 00:05:41.000 --> 00:05:42.353 to multiple case studies. 00:05:43.270 --> 00:05:45.580 Then you need to code another construct. 00:05:45.580 --> 00:05:48.380 So this is the use of politics. 00:05:48.380 --> 00:05:50.560 And then this article Eisenhardt coded 00:05:51.590 --> 00:05:53.410 these different tactics 00:05:53.410 --> 00:05:55.510 of different politic tactics 00:05:55.510 --> 00:05:57.230 and whether they found evidence 00:05:57.230 --> 00:05:59.670 of these tactics within the cases 00:05:59.670 --> 00:06:02.690 and if there were more of these tactics applied, 00:06:02.690 --> 00:06:06.830 then are the use of power of politics was more common 00:06:06.830 --> 00:06:09.990 than if there was just a few of these tactics applied. 00:06:09.990 --> 00:06:12.700 And we can see that politics is practiced 00:06:12.700 --> 00:06:15.570 in these organizations, these three, four. 00:06:15.570 --> 00:06:16.990 Then three first, 00:06:16.990 --> 00:06:19.370 the fourth is kind of like maybe, 00:06:19.370 --> 00:06:21.750 the fifth is kind of like maybe as well. 00:06:21.750 --> 00:06:25.330 And then these final three are no. 00:06:25.330 --> 00:06:28.030 We can see here that there's a clear association 00:06:28.030 --> 00:06:30.460 that where politics is practiced, 00:06:30.460 --> 00:06:32.140 power is also centralized. 00:06:32.140 --> 00:06:34.900 So there's clear evidence of association, 00:06:34.900 --> 00:06:36.810 but how do we then claim 00:06:36.810 --> 00:06:40.610 that this association is actually causal relationship? 00:06:40.610 --> 00:06:44.680 We do so by explaining the causal process, 00:06:44.680 --> 00:06:47.620 and they explained the course of process here. 00:06:47.620 --> 00:06:48.990 So they show first, 00:06:48.990 --> 00:06:52.660 say that there's evidence of politics in table three. 00:06:52.660 --> 00:06:56.900 And then they start to analyze why was politics applied? 00:06:56.900 --> 00:07:01.880 They found a couple of facts from the data. 00:07:01.880 --> 00:07:05.350 So executive view politics as beneficial 00:07:05.350 --> 00:07:07.340 to have power over CEO. 00:07:07.340 --> 00:07:11.710 So executives view the politics were useful. 00:07:11.710 --> 00:07:14.680 Executives are also frustrated with the CEO 00:07:14.680 --> 00:07:17.390 because the CEO had power centralized to him 00:07:17.390 --> 00:07:19.250 and the executives felt that 00:07:19.250 --> 00:07:22.370 they did not have enough power themselves. 00:07:22.370 --> 00:07:25.890 And finally politics were seen as necessary 00:07:25.890 --> 00:07:27.700 to getting things done 00:07:27.700 --> 00:07:31.970 and getting things decided 00:07:31.970 --> 00:07:34.653 even if the CEO wanted to decide otherwise? 00:07:35.930 --> 00:07:37.720 So, we have these facts; 00:07:37.720 --> 00:07:40.500 executive view politics as beneficial, 00:07:40.500 --> 00:07:42.780 executives are frustrated with the CEO 00:07:42.780 --> 00:07:47.110 and politics were seen as necessary to get things done. 00:07:47.110 --> 00:07:50.070 Based on these facts and the association, 00:07:50.070 --> 00:07:51.760 we then write a theory, 00:07:51.760 --> 00:07:52.740 which could say that 00:07:52.740 --> 00:07:55.730 the centralization of power to the CEO causes frustration 00:07:55.730 --> 00:07:59.190 in other executives because the executives feels 00:07:59.190 --> 00:08:00.830 that they cannot influence the systems 00:08:00.830 --> 00:08:01.960 in the normal way. 00:08:01.960 --> 00:08:04.340 They feel that the politics are the only alternative. 00:08:04.340 --> 00:08:06.210 By this way, centralization of power 00:08:06.210 --> 00:08:09.940 to the CEO causes other executives to use politics. 00:08:09.940 --> 00:08:11.680 So this is an explanation 00:08:11.680 --> 00:08:15.240 of why the (indistinct) CEOs use politics 00:08:15.240 --> 00:08:18.810 and why the CEO power was the trigger 00:08:18.810 --> 00:08:20.560 for the use of politics. 00:08:20.560 --> 00:08:21.910 And this is basically 00:08:21.910 --> 00:08:26.203 how the proposition one is justified in the paper.